With a decade passed since the September 11th attacks – are we any safer than we were on September 10, 2001? The answer is complex.

Yes we are safer from a larger scale terrorist attack because the Al Qaeda infrastructure that threatened us pre-9-11 is gone. Ongoing risks remain from the likes of ‘lone wolves,’ or loosely organized groups of jihadist attackers (i.e. July 7^th bombings in London) and clumsy conspiracies (i.e. the Richard Reid shoe bomb attempt and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab – the “underwear bomber” and the more recent Times Square car bombing attempt). These types of threats are still around but attacks are poorly organized and not well supplied.

I believe we are beyond the point of large scale attacks and there is a limitation on the amount of harm that perpetrators can inflict on their victims, due to lack of organization and access to materials. Poisoning the water source and biological factors are far less likely because we have a network of people preventing the “wrong” people getting equipment to facilitate a successful attack.

Take for example the case of Faisal Shahzad, the man behind the Times Square car bomb attempt – the best thing he could get his hands on was barbeque propane and fireworks. If that’s the best lone wolf attackers can do, it’s an indication we are safer.

We also need to remember that our safety has come at a tremendous cost in terms of individuals’ time / privacy and expenses for organizations like the TSA.  The cost of the inconvenience and time spent by the vast majority of non criminals who have to wait in long security lines and be subject to random searches is a huge waste and this lost time has a financial effect.

We know first hand from conversations with our clients that the global political and economic climate has had an enormous impact on the high-net-worth community.

The wealthy have taken a hard look at how they are living their lives. They have taken active measures to change the way they are viewed by the rest of the world, with some even changing their extravagant spending behaviors and business travel practices.

In order to further understand and serve our clientele in a new age of increased security concerns, Insite Security commissioned a study from IBOPE Zogby International to gauge the influence and impact global unrest has had on the high-net-worth community.

We encourage you to take a moment to read our white paper and study the findings. Should you have any questions about the survey – or to inquire further about our security offering – please contact us at info@insitesecurity.com or 212.362.5700.

Close the door. Lock it. Set the alarm. That’s how most people last left their summer homes in 2010. With Memorial Day around the corner, many will be flocking to their summer oasis for the first time this year and reopening their estates for the summer months.

Here are a few key tips for opening your vacation home this summer:

• Have a professional check your alarm system on an annual basis. Include fire alarms, sprinkler systems and carbon monoxide alarms on this check list. If you didn’t do it when you closed up the house last fall, then do it now! Alarms are only as good as their upkeep!
• Do a walk through of the home and property before you enter. Check for broken windows, trampled gardens, or other signs of property damage. If you see damage has been done to the outside of the home, call the police immediately to report it before entering the home.
• Once inside, do a room by room search to make sure that there’s been no water damage, infestation or other damage inflicted while the house has been closed.
• Check to be sure gas (pilot lights), electric and water are all in working order. In other words, don’t wait until you are cooking to see if the gas stove is working!
• Check on your insurance policies and make sure they are up to date.

The United States has done a very good job of compromising al Qaeda’s ability to plan any meaningful attack since September 11, 2011. We have precluded bin Laden’s command and control over al Qaeda and as a result, al Qaeda has been reduced to scattered one-off attacks versus coordinated, high impact attacks, with mass casualties.

Bin Laden’s actual death doesn’t increase our overall safety in the near term, however it does remove the singular emotional appeal and communicates to the world that we are not as vulnerable as we may appear. It is highly doubtful that al Qaeda has the organizational capacity to set up some synchronized operation to be activated in the event of bin Laden’s death. Al Qaeda is truly a shard of what it once was, thanks to the worldwide intelligence community and the U.S. military.

However, that doesn’t mean that the risk of attack is any less than it was yesterday. In fact, the risk level to the average person in the United States has not changed, but people, especially those abroad, need to be vigilant and try to think the way a terrorist would. The attack last week in Marrakesh, Morocco is case in point. We’ve been cautioning clients about visiting Morocco for years and one has to question the wisdom of sitting in a cafe in an open, crowded tourist area (in a country that is sympathetic to the U.S.) has to be questioned.

Remember to be aware of your surroundings and keep in mind basic security precautions during this emotionally time charged time. If you see something suspicious, don’t hesitate to say something or reach out to a security official nearby.

The Japanese earthquake and tsunami reveal how even well prepared people can fall victim to natural disaster. It is true that apparently nothing can protect the vulnerable from a magnitude 8.9 earthquake. Yet there are some lessons, learned time and time again, that are being observed in the Japanese situation.

1) Communications. In emergencies, our communication system is vulnerable. So much transmits over both cell and landline service that the increased volume in emergencies cannot be expected to be accommodated. This is true now even of text messages, which previously were thought to get through cell traffic jams. Now, satellite telephones are essential. Some new mobile phones can double both as GSM and Sat phones and are the only communication method that won’t be shut down by terrestrial disturbances. The key with one of those phones is a power source.

2) Water. The problem in areas of Japan is not water – it is potable water. This is why all Insite clients traveling to remotely upset areas take water purification equipment. Like sat phones, water purifiers have gotten much smaller and are easy to take and useful in a wide variety of emergencies.

3) Nuclear disaster. Of most worry to Americans is the vulnerability of nuclear reactors. When a nuclear release is of concern, it is of great value to have an extra layer – we use Tyvek suits that can be worn in the hot zone and discarded, thereby leaving residual radiation on the suit and not on the inner layer of clothing. This, and emergency doses of Potassium iodide (also called KI) in the event of the release of radioactive iodine to protect the thyroid from absorbing radiation, are steps one can take to prepare for a large scale disaster with potential nuclear implications.

The Financial Times’ White Collar Crime Reporter Kara Scannell included Christopher Falkenberg of Insite Security as the lead source in a front page story titled, “SEC case prompts hedge funds to sweep for bugs.” See below for a snapshot of the story:

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Hedge fund managers are hiring security firms to sweep their offices and homes for listening devices, security experts say, in reaction to the US government’s insider trading investigations.

“Over the past six months, there has been a really heightened interest in electronic sweeps for hedge funds,” said Christopher Falkenberg, founder of Insite Security, a security and risk management firm in New York. “They’re working harder at clamping down on their information security and making sure the telephones are secured and the offices aren’t being bugged. We’ve also been asked to sweep traders’ homes.”

Read more here http://bit.ly/InsiteSecurityFT

The recent spate of gun violence – including the most recent deaths of two Fort Lauderdale police officers on Monday and the Tucson massacre two weeks ago which left 6 dead and 12 wounded – including Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords – has had the country on edge.

While we may never know the true motives behind these disturbed individuals, we wanted to offer some advice for surviving an active shooter situation.

Quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life.

• You can’t help anyone else or alert the police if you are not watching out for your own survival.

Evacuate.

• Have an escape route and plan in mind
• Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
• Leave your belongings behind
• Keep your hands visible

If You Can’t Evacuate, Hide Out.

• Hide in an area out of the active shooter’s view
• Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors
• Do not trap yourself or restrict your options for movement, if possible
• Silence your cell phone and / or pager

Take Action.

• As a last resort, when you cannot flee and only when in imminent danger, attempt to incapacitate the shooter
• Act with physical aggression. Throw items at the shooter to attempt to disarm and/or incapacitate him/her – if only for a moment to allow yourself to get out to safety

Call 911 When It Is Safe To Do So.

• If you cannot speak and must remain quiet, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen
• Remain calm and follow officers’ instructions

While this is something no one wants to think about, the more mentally prepared you are, the more likely you are to survive the situation.

By MATTHEW HARWOOD

Published on Security Management

Christopher Falkenberg and Christopher Voss discuss the threat of an executive or employee kidnapping and why the Southwest could see an increase in such crimes.

Christopher Falkenberg, president of Insite Security, is a corporate and personal security expert. He is a former U.S. Secret Service Agent and attorney. While with the Secret Service, Mr. Falkenberg conducted numerous protective advances for the President, government officials both here and abroad and visiting dignitaries. At Insite Security, he regularly consults with Fortune 1000 companies and high-net-worth individuals on threat assessments and management, executive and family protection, security training, evacuation training, workplace security, disaster recovery planning and much more.

Christopher Voss joined Insite Security in 2009, as the managing director and leader of the firm’s Kidnapping Resolution Practice. His role is to address the security needs and protection of corporate employees and high-net-worth individuals. Mr. Voss received his training on hostage survival and negotiations during his 24-year tenure with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Throughout his career, Mr. Voss has negotiated more than 150 hostage releases and was awarded the FBI Agent’s Association Award for Distinguished and Exemplary Service and the Attorney General’s Award for Excellence in Law Enforcement.

At 4:30 pm on Thursday, October 14, Falkenberg and Voss will conduct the session “Corporate Kidnapping: Preparing Management for the Unthinkable” at the ASIS International 56th Annual Seminar and Exhibits. The session will discuss how a company can integrate a working plan into its existing decision-making structure, raise awareness of ethical and legal parameters surrounding a kidnapping, and prepare security professionals and executives to handle conversations with a professional kidnapping negotiator.

What are you gentlemen presenting on during seminar?

Voss: As we continue to help companies understand corporate kidnapping cases, there are some consistent types of misperceptions or disconnects in these types of cases that we are seeing.We’d like to take this chance at the ASIS seminar to help people understand what they’re getting into.

When most companies deal with a kidnapping it’s probably their first time. And since they’re used to dealing with a high-pressure environment, they don’t quite understand how their approach to problem solving doesn’t quite translate to this environment. I get asked the same questions over and over by experienced CEOs who deal with stressful situations and they just need some help in understanding their current approach to problems and how it needs to be tweaked during a kidnapping.

What are those questions?

Voss: One organization we talked to had a sister organization that had someone kidnapped. The CEO called me back and asked me if I had been following it in the press. I had been aware of it, but I hadn’t been following it closely and I told the CEO that. And the CEO said, “Take a good look at it and I think this kidnapping is going to be the model for all kidnappings of this type.” I thought all right, maybe there’s something unusual here, I’ll take a closer look at it. And I did, and I looked at the reporting on it and there was absolutely nothing remarkable about the case. It was a cookie-cutter case like dozens and dozens just like it in the 150 cases that I’ve seen. So my question was this: “If this is not a new case, then the issue is it’s new to this CEO.” CEOs aren’t used to getting hit by things that are new to them. So if it’s completely new to them, they think it must be new to the world. Because in their world, they’re so experienced: they know what they’re doing. I realized that kidnapping tests people who aren’t used to being caught off guard.

When you guys go out and work, how much resistance do you receive from your customers?

Voss: We don’t get resistance once we have been hired. It’s helping them understand what the need is and what the possibilities are. It’s a little bit like trying to describe a jet airplane to a person who has only flown in propeller-driven planes. For example, if you’re flying a Corsair from World War II and someone tries to describe what it’s like to be in a supersonic plane.The Corsair pilot thinks they’ve got the fastest, most agile fighter out there. It’s hard to describe something faster.So it’s trying to help people grasp something that they have no way of understanding, because they’ve never been in the situation before, and they’re so experienced in their own worldview that they have trouble believing that this situation is different.

What types of companies need to seek out Insite’s expertise? I would think the vast majority of businesses don’t really need kidnap protection strategies.

Falkenberg: I disagree with that characterization. I think any business that does any work abroad, sends its employees abroad, has employees that live abroad, or has responsibilities for contractors or subcontractors that operate abroad should be concerned about kidnapping. I also think we’re heading toward a period where companies that have significant operations in Southwestern states like California, Texas, and Arizona all have to be concerned about this.

There are two issues. Obviously, kidnap for ransom is much more prominent abroad than it is within the United States. Obviously firms that exclusively send their employees to the United Kingdom or Germany have to be concerned less than companies that send employees to Mexico and Ecuador. Any of these countries that have kidnapping operations – Asia, South America, Africa, and the Middle East – have to do this. Vis-a-vis U.S. operations, it is becoming quite clear that the incidents of kidnapping for ransom in the Southwest, principally in areas where there is a lot of Mexican-American gang involvement, is increasing. Today, most of the targets of that type of kidnapping are poor people who have a background similar to the perpetrators. It seems inevitable to us that because ransom rates are so much higher when you start kidnapping wealthier people that that’s going to happen in the United States, in these areas in particular, and that companies that operate there should have a plan in place. I think Chris will tell you the trajectory of a domestic kidnapping in Texas, Arizona, or California is quite different than what it is abroad and far more dangerous.

Is the divide between kidnapping for money and kidnapping to kill?

Voss: In a domestic U.S. kidnapping, the kidnappers know that there’s a higher likelihood that they’re going to be caught, which makes the victim a liability. And the victim is the best witness against the kidnappers. Because of the penalties in the U.S. for kidnapping – they’re not only going to get caught but the law is going to be enforced.They are going to do life in prison, if not potentially face the death penalty. Therefore they must get rid of that key witness. Internationally, kidnappers are not faced with those kinds of penalties, so the witness is not that much of a liability and that’s the principal difference.They can let a witness be ransomed out internationally and be quite comfortable that more than likely that witness is not going to testify against them, so the victim is no longer a threat.

So the lesson here is that there’s a greater likelihood of getting kidnapped overseas but also a greater likelihood of surviving the ordeal?

Voss: If you’re kidnapped overseas, the chances you’ll survive is very high, physically. Now how you survive psychologically – if you ever regain your life again – that is another question. I know many kidnap victims who were kidnapped five, six, seven years ago, they’re still not over it. That has much more to do with how that kidnapping is handled while you are in captivity.

So many kidnapping victims essentially get PTSD?

Voss: Exactly, not only the victims, but the families get it. There are studies that indicate that the families of kidnap victims are suffering PTSD at roughly the same rates as the kidnap victims themselves are.

Looking ahead, have we seen a greater escalation in kidnapping rates all across the world over time?

Voss: Internationally, for political reasons, the kidnapping rates around the world jumped coincidentally with the end of the second Iraq War. Now as a general rule, it’s pretty much stayed the same worldwide, but it tends to move around. For example, the kidnap rate in Haiti three years ago was extremely high. In the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, we dealt in early 2005 to late 2006 with probably over 150 kidnappings in Haiti alone. There were so many of them that we had to spread them out throughout the Crisis Negotiation Unit. While that rate has gotten much lower in Haiti, Mexico has jumped up. Mexican kidnappings are being exported down into Central America since the Mexicans have created such an efficient and lucrative model for kidnapping.Drug gangs are making more money off of kidnapping then they were drug dealing. It’s like a virus that spreads.

What are the greatest kidnapping threats facing American companies? Do you feel the threat is bigger internally in the Southwest or is it anywhere people travel?

Voss: The Southwest is a growing threat because the Mexican- American gang problem is getting out of control and it’s an extremely lucrative business. And if American companies do business overseas, they think that they’re safer if they don’t send American workers. But the reality is that the local businessman is a higher target anyway. A typical American such as myself, I walk into Tijuana, I probably won’t get kidnapped. I could probably get shot and killed, either by stray gunfire or someone trying to murder me, but they don’t like kidnapping in Tijuana. Now the company I’m working for or that I own, if I decide in order to be safer I’ll send someone that lives in Tijuana, that’s their target anyway.

What’s the reason behind that?

Voss: Any kidnapping industry that has any maturity knows that if it kidnaps a U.S. citizen, the U.S. government is going to get involved. And they don’t want Uncle Sam and all those resources coming across the border. History has shown that as long as local citizens are getting kidnapped in Mexico, the U.S. is not getting heavily involved. They’ve come to learn that it’s very practical—every now and then they’ll accidentally grab an American citizen. But I’ve seen Americans pushed out of the way in order to grab what they thought was a local citizen who happened to be a dual-national. So every time they grab an American citizen, suddenly Uncle Sam’s law enforcement and resources are focused on that. So they’ll do it once or twice by accident and then they’ll come to realize that as long as they don’t grab Americans, then Uncle Sam doesn’t come across the border. That’s when they start to take the business associates of the companies that are doing business down in these countries.

What’s really worrisome about the Southwest then if the kidnappers are going to be reluctant to come across and kidnap any Americans?

Voss: They’re going to kidnap the Mexican-American businessman that we’re trying to do business with and they’re coming across the border to take them.

So the kidnappers know their intended victims’ travels and they pick a weak point to grab them?

Voss: Kidnappers go after low-hanging fruit. They’re going to pick the people that are easy to get and they’re going after more and more legit businessmen, so if I’m going to do business in Mexico and I hire a Mexican-American to do business for me, that’s the guy they’re going to go after.

So where does the kidnapping threat to companies in the Southwest come from if kidnappers are afraid to grab them inside the United States?

Falkenberg: In the Southwest you have either members or former members of gangs who live there. And those are the people who are engaging in kidnappings now of other ethnic Mexicans, and their sights are entirely likely to shift up the food chain, I think.

You fear they’re going to go after bigger fish?

Falkenberg: Yes, it’s a business. If you can achieve a five or ten thousand dollar ransom in kidnapping someone from the neighborhood and realize you can achieve a $100,000 ransom kidnapping somebody who lives in an affluent area or is coming out of corporate business park, it’s inevitable that that’s going to occur. And it’s also inevitable that it will be a much more dangerous situation for the victim because law enforcement will get involved and the perpetrators will be really concerned about getting caught because they don’t have collusive policemen to protect them as they do in foreign countries.

What do you say to the companies that don’t have a lot of resources but do want to develop kidnapping response plans? How should they go about that?

Falkenberg: It doesn’t require deep pockets to do the planning. None of this is incredibly expensive when you consider the risk. It’s not costly to engage a consultant to help you plan this. I think it’s rare that you’re going to find a real company that hasn’t looked at their crisis management plan, which has either hired someone in-house or sought some assistance on their disaster preparedness plan or business continuity plan or crisis management plan. A kidnapping is a crisis, but it’s a particular type of crisis, so it doesn’t require a multinational company with millions in a security budget to fully prepare. Nor does it require a ransom payment. But is there self-help guidance that we can offer? Yes, I think we’ll try to offer that at the seminar.

Voss: Seminar attendees should be able to check into the U.S. policy on their own and prep their own legal counsel. And we’ll tell them exactly what to do and how to prep them in order to do that. They should be able to begin to involve their own H.R. team to be able to minimize the traumatic stress damage to the victim and everyone else who is going to suffer traumatic stress. It’s understanding that the victims here aren’t just the kidnap victims but there are other people that are going to be damaged, potentially to the point of not being able to function as a result of the kidnapping. And they’re not even the victim.

It depends.

In 2008, Kurt William Havelock plotted a massacre outside the Sun Devil Stadium in Arizona, the location of that year’s Super Bowl. He mailed death threats to surrounding media outlets, saying things like “I will sacrifice your children upon the altar of your excess” and “it will be swift and bloody.” Mr. Havelock surrendered to local police and was convicted on six counts of mailing threatening letters.

Last week, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction of Mr. Havelock, on the basis that threats to corporations are legal. According to the Judge William Canby, “the ‘person’ to whom the mail is addressed must be an individual person, not an institution or corporation.”

This decision is a miscarriage of justice and should have us all worried.

The vast majority of people making threats and carrying out their violent acts do not threaten individual targets, but rather they communicate via veiled threats (i.e. making broad sweeping threats about an organization, corporation, or any other group of people). Institutions including non-profits, religious groups, political groups, etc. are simply groups of individuals who have a connection with each other and equally suffer from threats as would any individual. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals makes a distinction between individuals and corporations where there should be none. The law is intended to protect all people from threats.

Timothy McVeigh was known for firing off angry letters to local papers with threats like “America is in serious decline. We have no proverbial tea to dump. Should we instead sink a ship of Japanese imports? Is a civil war imminent? Do we have to shed blood to reform the current system? I hope it doesn’t come to that, but it might.” He also rages on against “cataclysmic” taxes, self-serving and corrupt politicians and the disappearance of the “American Dream.” These threats were not against a specific person – but they ultimately resulted in the deaths of 168 people (19 of them children under the age of 6) when Mr. McVeigh blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April of 1995.

Threats themselves are crimes and should be handled as such. Ultimately, “person-hood” vs. “organization” is not the real issue here – the issue is that making threats are illegal. Period.

Close the door. Lock it. Set the alarm.

This is how most people close up their summer homes. Yet an unprecedented amount of people fail to take the necessary steps to make sure that alarm system is functioning properly.

Here are some key tips about keeping your summer home safe:

Alarms are essentially “dumb” electronic devices that, like any other frequently used device, are prone to failure and have certain components that are more reliable than others. Have a professional check your alarm system on an annual basis. A trusted and experienced electronic security installer will be able to assess your system prior to closing the house up and determine if any part should be replaced in a preventative nature.

Alarms are good at one thing – alerting people that something may be amiss at your home. Equally important to the initial alarm is a response mechanism. Have a family friend or community contact that is available on short notice to come to the house to open the door for the police, to conduct an outside inspection and to look for environmental damage such as water, or excessive cold / hot temperatures. All of these problems can be detected by alarm systems and done so without a great deal of advanced technology, however, it is in the analysis and response to those signals where alarm systems offer their best value.

Fire is also a big risk to summer houses. Often times local fire departments are staffed by volunteers and have a long response rate. It’s important to make a thorough assessment of fire risk, both as to what equipment can be put in the house to prevent fire and also what kind of insurance coverage you should have in case a fire does occur in a closed summer house.

When building a new summer house consider installing a residential sprinkler system. Sprinklers can dramatically reduce the risk of fire. However, because sprinklers can not be turned off remotely or electronically, they can also be a source of water damage. Therefore, it is crucial when installing sprinklers to make sure that there is a robust system in place to respond to the home if the sprinkler is activated. Have a “human” response ready to step in and make sure the water valve is easily identifiable and accessible, even to strangers.

Electronic security is not the end of the security obligation. Homes must have strong locks which should be secured prior to closing. There may be extra deadbolt locks that are not used during the summer, make sure these locks are installed and locked prior to leaving the house. For houses that have large amounts of glass exposure, consider using security window film to make it more difficult to break through the glass and break into the house.

All of these steps will go a long way to ensuring that when you return next spring, your house will be in top shape and ready for the opening spring security check list.

Christopher T. Voss and Christopher Falkenberg

The Obama administration recently proposed to carve out an exception to the “Miranda Rule” for terrorists making it easier for law enforcement to work around these rights and try and extract vital information immediately, without potential suspect/attorney oversight.

As former federal law enforcement officials, you’d think we’d be in favor of it. We’re not.

First, Miranda warnings are irrelevant to the success of effective interrogators. Second, Miranda warnings, as now offered, are ineffective in advising criminal defendants of the downsides of speaking to the police.

As every viewer of television knows, Miranda warnings are issued by the police at the time of arrest and prior to questioning. This requirement arose out of the 1966 case Miranda v Arizona that made inadmissible admissions made by a criminal defendant unless that defendant had been advised by the police that he or she had the Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.

Our collective experience in law enforcement has taught us that Miranda is irrelevant. This issue, rather, is one of interrogator efficacy. Rapport-based interrogators who have the best track record of gaining reliable information deal with Miranda on a routine basis and it doesn’t inhibit their effectiveness.

As a society we are offended to be giving rights to those who would destroy our ability to give those rights in the first place. Our reaction is, “If you hate our system so much, why should you benefit from any of it?” Others say “What if they stop talking?” Suspects don’t stop talking due to Miranda. They stop talking due to poor interrogation. Miranda was designed to limit sloppy, coercive and illegal interrogations. If Miranda is an obstacle to any interrogator, they aren’t effective in the first place and the Miranda issue is a red herring.

A second issue is the relative ineffectiveness of the Miranda warnings in emboldening criminal defendants to resist police efforts at coercive interrogation. Studies show most people don’t understand the Miranda warning anyway. One study found 95% of college students wrongly believed that a confession would nullify their right to counsel. It’s also proven to be ineffective in helping to protect defendant’s rights in that the overwhelming majority of suspects waive their rights after being Mirandized.

The question then becomes “So if it’s irrelevant, and ineffective, why not drop it anyway?” The larger issue becomes how we treat terrorists affects how successful the recruiters for terrorism are. To defend this country we have to address the sources of terrorism. One of those sources is our image in the world to the undecided, and we cannot provide more evidence to the terrorist recruiters on which to base their perverted case that Islam compels jihad against the United States.

The truly evil enemies are the recruiters. They exploit the undecided and when we mistreat terrorist suspects we send the signal that either we don’t believe in our own system or we deny its benefits to outsiders. When we cast the rest of the world as outsiders we give the recruiters opportunity. The argument that we created more terrorists by water boarding than we stopped is a valid one.

Recruiters for terrorism literally danced in the streets when George W. Bush said America was on a “crusade.” It made Osama bin Laden so happy that he held his own press conference to celebrate. He knew that small word choice drove millions of Muslims around the world farther away from the US. Arabs and Muslims who are trying to support the US against extremism remain as sensitive to these kinds of issues as African-Americans remain sensitive to things like Virginia’s declaration of a Confederate History Month that fails to mention slavery.

So much of the incitement that drives terrorism arises from the perception Muslims in the United States are disparately treated, a perception that a terror exception to Miranda would fuel. Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical Imam whose success in provoking terrorists has earned him a spot on the C.I.A.’s list of terrorists approved as a target for killing, focuses on perceived inequality within the U.S. in his recruitment. In his March 2002 talk at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Fairfax, VA., he stated “it is the responsibility of us as Muslims to make it very clear to the world that American Muslims are persecuted on a religious basis.” Changing basic criminal procedure as it applies to terrorism suspects will have a much more deleterious effect on America’s image in the Arab world, and thus the long-term success of our anti-terror strategy, than it will have any short-term benefit in discrete terrorism cases.

Others will say that terrorism suspects should be characterized as “enemy combatants” and essentially removed from the criminal justice system, eliminating the need to issue the Miranda warnings. Yet almost ten years after September 11, the US still has a primarily law enforcement-centric approach to domestic security, and creating an alternative avenue for pursuing domestic terrorists is simply not practical, and will not be for the foreseeable future.

When we choose not to extend Miranda to terrorism suspects it gives ammunition to Anwar al-Awlaki and his ilk to claim that we are persecuting Muslims. It plays into the hands of those who would destroy us and creates barriers between us and those who would support us.

Mr. Voss is a retired Supervisory Special Agent of the FBI where he was the lead hostage negotiator for the Crisis Negotiation Unit at Quantico. He is now a Managing Director at Insite Security. Mr. Falkenberg is a former Special Agent of the US Secret Service and is President of Insite Security.

I had an explosives instructor who once said, “If I can make it beep I can make it blow up,” explaining that the triggering mechanism for an explosive device is no different than than the closing of a circuit that makes an alarm clock sound or flashlight illuminate. Because this is true, what is it that makes something suspicious? The real issue is whether the item seems to belong where it is discovered. Many bombs are disguised as abandoned property. This is immediately remarkable because very little property is abandoned in the middle of a city. Less remarkable on transit lines, where people frequently forget their belongings. The most effective are disguised so that they seem to belong there and are not remarkable enough to draw scrutiny.

It is hard to reduce the risk to exposure to package bombs and other IEDs. The first step is to reduce the amount of time you spend in predicable target areas. Second is to reduce the amount of time you spend moving from one safe location to another. Third is to be sensitive to any feelings or awkwardness or danger that you detect regarding a given item or place. Act on these impulses as interviews of crime victims and survivors of disasters often report a feeling of impending danger before the incident. If you credit these internal feelings you will have a chance to survive a bombing.

Among the things one needs to launch a successful terror attack are willing participants and access to sufficient supplies to carry out the attack. Looking at what was found in the Nissan Pathfinder last night we see a very simple device comprised of hardware store supplies and some fireworks. The composition of the bomb reveals a lack of bomb making skill as well as an inability to obtain real equipment like explosives, even nitrate based fertilizer. As a result, I believe that even if the device had been set off, it would have resulted in a big fire with  limited casualties. If this was the result of an organized terror cell then we have very little to worry about as the threat from this type of low level attack is minimal. Similarly, if the recent claim of responsibility from Pakistani al Qaeda groups is legit it calls into question their ability to pull off large attacks. This, and the obvious difficulty this group had in procuring explosives (after working hard to disguise ownership of the car) are encouraging.

I think the driver will be caught quickly. If he turns out to be a radicalized American then this discovery will dovetail with the recent indictments in Brooklyn of two Americans for aiding al Qaeda to reveal a depth of domestic security threats that is worth worrying about.

The earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, as well as other recent natural disasters, raise questions regarding disaster preparedness for travelers. Much thought is given to man-made disasters such as terrorism, but relatively little to natural and unpredictable catastrophes. It is important for the corporate security manager or other c-level executives to embrace a holistic approach to risk mitigation including natural disasters and their results.

In the recent earthquakes, steps such as redundant communication systems and basic survival supplies could have helped travelers tremendously. Issuing satellite phones, like we do for Insite’s clients travelling to remote and less developed locales, would have helped tremendously in Haiti for example. Similarly, preparing travelers with basic medical supplies and the means of contacting a physician can also be of great help in emergencies where resources are stretched. Our partnership with World Clinic (www.worldclinic.com) provides our clients with a concierge medical solution that is prepared for disasters like the earthquakes of 2010 and other disasters we’ve witnessed over the past few years.

Lastly, where possible, security advisors should consider things such as building safety, construction standards and building codes in recommending hotel choices for travelers, as a variety of emergencies, such as fire, flood or earthquake, may make these judgments very important.  Prior to the Haitian earthquake we would have scoped out the hotels our clients were planning on staying in to ensure the soundness of their construction and would have planned for and provided evacuation planning.

Travel security goes well beyond the hiring of a driver or a physical security presence when traveling overseas; it requires a deeper level of thinking and preparation than can usually be handled in-house. Working with experts in this field can help mitigate problems when they arise thanks to proper planning and the ability to execute in difficult situations.

Has anyone recently dealt with a travel emergency? Be it foreign or domestic? Feel free to post and discuss!

The earthquake in Haiti gives rise to questions about emergency preparedness in general for those traveling to third world countries. Although there is little tourism in Haiti, there is a great deal in the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola. The Caribbean in general is an active seismic area, and travelers to Caribbean islands put themselves at risk from earthquake, tsunami, flooding and severe tropical storms.

The results of the earthquake in Haiti are predictable. There is no communication and the transportation infrastructure is compromised. No one can get calls in or out of Haiti, and even calls to the Dominican Republic are exceedingly slow. Both cell and landline phone services are either out of service or severely compromised. I expect it will soon become hard to find potable water in Port Au Prince. The environment is dusty, hot and humid, with little safe shelter due to the risk of aftershocks and fire.

What should travelers do to prepare for these risks? The first step is to contemplate them: how many people go on a trip with no thought to the safety and security issues that they commonly consider at home? There is a broad range of issues one should consider prior to travel, including medical care, road safety and crime, to name a few. Specific to natural disaster, we advise clients to prepare for a few contingencies:

Loss of communication: people traveling in the third world should travel with satellite phones. They are the only reliable form of communication following a real emergency. Even cities will have overloaded cell and local circuits, but satellite telephone is a means of keeping in touch on the go.

Clean water: water safety in urban areas is a rare but hugely dangerous issue. When supplies of bottled water either dry up or lose their integrity, travelers risk diseases such as widespread dysentery, particularly cholera. It is therefore useful to pack a water treatment kit to insure that you can convert water from whatever source into drinking water and avoid dangerous dehydration. Use a filter rather than IR purification to minimize risks from inorganic substances that may be in the water.

Lighting: in my earlier career as a Secret Service agent, I found no tool as useful as a good flashlight. Its uses are limitless, but include signaling, evacuation and crime prevention. Travelers should get a good LED flashlight with a clip and carry it on their person or in their handbag.

Air safety: N95 masks protect against a wide variety of problems, but in this case can permit the user to breathe more easily in the midst of dust and other contaminants soiling the air. A smoke mask is also a good idea, and both masks can fit easily into a small luggage compartment or pocket.

This equipment takes up little space and may never be used, but when needed these items can prove essential.

For more than 4 years I was one of the most highly trained personal body guards in the world. Serving as a United States Secret Service Special Agent. It was our job to ensure that the President of the United States (POTUS) was protected from any and all physical threats.

When I was guarding President Clinton it would have been crazy for him to carry a weapon on his person, or to have an untrained member of his inner circle carry a gun. The President of the United States is arguably the most valuable individual in the entire world, and his employer, the Government of the United States, is mandated to protect this highly-valued, very public, employee and not leave it up to him to protect himself.

Reading the stories about Gilbert Arenas carrying multiple firearms into his workplace or remembering back to the Plaxico Burress incident where he accidentally shot himself at a night club, it struck me as insane that the owners of NFL, MLB or NBA teams do not, as a matter or course, provide highly professional protection services to their players when off the court/field. Owners spend tens if not hundreds of millions on their players each year and do a fabulous job of protecting their athletes (investments) and fans at sports stadiums and fields, but once their players leave “the office” the teams cease to provide protection.

Sure most teams have training seminars for athletes on how to protect themselves, their loved ones and property. But, for the most part, teams leave it up to the athletes to protect themselves. How many do this is either through hiring personal “body guards” from their close knit group of untrained friends or by buying and carrying a weapon (usually legally). These posse-based security solutions rarely solve the problem. A security professional is trained to help avoid dangerous situations, to diffuse conflicts and to keep their protectees away from danger. Having your best friend from home carry a Glock is a recipe for trouble.

Exxon/Mobile provides 24-hour security for its CEO, Rex Tillerson, why wouldn’t the New York Giants provide the same type of security for Plaxico, or the Washington Wizards for Arenas?

The attack on Silvio Berlusconi reveals some weakness in Carabinieri security. First is the importance of distance. Distance equals time in an attack, and there wasn’t much distance between Berlusconi and the attacker on the rope line where he was accosted.

A more important issue is the crowding around the car and the apparent difficulty of getting the protectee into the car safely. A number of questions come to mind—was this an impromptu event? Was any security advance conducted? Was there any screening of the people in the rope-line area waiting to shake hands?

Assuming the statuette that was used as a weapon was non-metallic, it is possible that a screening process would have detected the assailant by sensing his affect. Media reports indicate the subject is mentally ill—were there signs of this illness that could have been observed by an attentive screener? How would the subject have responded to a question about his mood, his reason for being there or his attitude towards the prime minister?

I think the lesson is that effective security is concentric and redundant, relying on anticipation of emergencies and multiple layers of preparation and protection in order to prevent them.

The LA Times reported last week that star basketball player Kobe Bryant of the Los Angeles Lakers did not attend a team shoot-around because of a home-invasion robbery at the house of a neighbor in his community. Apparently, a SWAT response resulted in the arrest of three people after a standoff at the home of one of Bryant’s Newport Beach, CA neighbors, while two suspects were still at large. Four of the suspects were apparently armed with handguns.

In this case, Bryant himself was not the target of the home invasion, although high-profile individuals are often tempting for criminals because so much information about their intended victims is available in the public domain. The home invasion took place inside a private gated community, which should prompt Bryant and the other residents to consider whether they should strengthen the security posture of their community.

The saga of Scott Rothstein and the collapse of an apparent fraud scheme points again to the failure of traditional due diligence in ferreting out fraud. From what little has been published regarding this unfortunate incident, someone checking up on Rothstein and his integrity would receive glowing reports. He lead a prominent law firm and had many friends in the bar. In addition, Rothstein was prominent in political circles in Florida, and I am sure that recipients of his fundraising largesse would gladly attest to his honesty. It is not known now what type of due diligence, if any, investors performed. Were there fake books and records? Was a bogus accountant involved, as in the case of Bayou and Madoff?

The one thing for sure is that Rothstein must have revealed his dishonest intentions when enticing others to participate in the fraud. Questions about returns and the security of invested funds certainly elicited verbal and non-verbal clues to his deception. Had one of the fleeced investors been able to detect the signs of his deception in advance, they could have avoided the loss. This is why I am so excited about our H Factor integrity practice, in which we deploy a behavioral scientist to assess people as they are speaking and determine if they are lying. It promises to be a huge step forward in avoiding future fraud.

Last week I attended the Family Office Exchange’s Fall Forum in Chicago for a chance to spend time with high net worth families and their advisors, a number of whom attended my special session on family security. FOX is a leading group in the HNW space, and it’s always valuable to hear input and feedback from their members.

This year, the top concern I heard from a number of participants, particularly families in metropolitan areas, is the lack of confidence in plans to prepare for emergencies and disasters. Despite government efforts over the past 8 years, families are still unsure of how best to prepare for or how to respond to a wide range of crucial scenarios, spanning weather emergencies to a potential terrorist attack.

The second issue on the minds of families and advisors is a concern over the role of staff when responding to emergencies. Household staff are eager to help and protect their employers and their children in adverse circumstances, but their good intensions may be misplaced or go awry. For example, staff may engage an unfamiliar trespasser directly without any protocol for making sure this person is not a threat or a plan for how to respond by securing the family and getting help if it turns out they are. Training staff is a key area when it comes to keeping families safe, and I’m glad family members and advisors are recognizing the issue and looking for solutions.

I discussed many more meaningful security issues and challenges with the FOX members and attendees. This year’s forum was engaging and educational, as always, and I’m looking forward to implementing some of what I learned.